A syllogism that yields scientific knowledge—or a “demonstration”—is not merely one in which the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises (a characteristic common to all syllogisms); rather, it is one in which the conclusion itself is necessary. Now, a conclusion can be necessary only if the premises from which it is derived are themselves necessary. It is a rule of modal syllogisms that if the middle term belongs necessarily to the major term, and the minor term belongs necessarily to the middle term, then the minor term must necessarily belong to the major term. Thus, a scientific syllogism—or demonstration—is defined by the nature of its premises. These premises must be true; they must be primary and immediate—and, consequently, indemonstrable (for if they themselves required demonstration, leading to an infinite regress, scientific knowledge would be forever impossible); they must contain the cause of the conclusion; and, finally, they must be logically prior to the conclusion and more easily known than it (I, 1, 2, and 6).
What are these indemonstrable propositions? First, there are common axioms, such as: “It is impossible for an attribute to both belong and not belong to the same subject at the same time and in the same respect.” However, such axioms serve as universal conditions—or common principles—for all scientific knowledge, and they do not contain the cause of any specific thing. The indemonstrable propositions that do contain the cause are those that define the nature of the entity to which an attribute is being ascribed—that is, definitions, which constitute the “proper principles” of demonstration[1]. The middle term must be drawn from the quiddity (the “whatness”) of the thing; there is a kind of equivalence between the middle term, the essence (or quiddity), the underlying reason, and the cause. Thus, astronomers discovered that the essence of a lunar eclipse lies in the interposition of the Earth between the Moon and the Sun; this interposition serves as the middle term through which it is demonstrated that the Moon undergoes an eclipse. If anybody, when separated in this way from its source of light, undergoes an eclipse, and if the Moon is indeed separated from its light source in this manner, it follows that the Moon undergoes an eclipse. It is always because the middle term is part of the essence of the major term—and because it is predicated of the minor term—that the major term can, in turn, be predicated of the minor term. A right angle is equal to half of two right angles, and since an angle inscribed in a semicircle is also half of two right angles, it follows that such an angle is equal to a right angle. Because one cannot attack an adversary without being attacked in return, the Athenians—who were the first to attack the Medes—found themselves attacked in turn. Because walking facilitates digestion, and because a healthy person digests easily, a healthy person may engage in walking. The middle term, therefore, always brings to light the essence—or an aspect of the essence—of the major term; the minor premise may simply be a statement of fact that predicates this essence of the minor term, and the resulting conclusion is necessarily true[2].
It is certain that, in a demonstration, the effect is analytically linked to the cause, given that the effect (a lunar eclipse) is, in essence, the same thing as the cause (the interposition of an opaque body). Nevertheless, the term “analytical link” is insufficient to characterize a demonstration, as this same type of link occurs in any syllogism, whether demonstrative or otherwise. As soon as one considers the connection characteristic of demonstration, it becomes clear that there exists, between the middle term and the effect, a link of derivation—a relationship of principle to consequence—which implies the real and effective priority of the middle term. The syllogism of the cause (or reason) goes beyond a mere play of concepts; it reaches reality itself.
Yet, precisely at this point and for this reason, the theory of science begins to extend beyond the scope of the Organon. It is, in fact, impossible to demonstrate a definition—that is, to make a definition the conclusion of a syllogism. The Organon is incompetent here; at most, it can demonstrate this very impossibility. Every demonstration shows that something is true of something else, whereas a definition states an essence and does not affirm one thing of another.[3] Furthermore, to construct such a demonstration, the cause of an essence would have to be distinct from the essence itself—which is not the case, since a thing is, by its very nature and immediately, what it is[4]. On the other hand, neither the Analytics nor the Topics provide a positive method for arriving at definitions. Nevertheless, the locus of such a method is indicated: it is an exceptionless principle that we can learn nothing except by starting from some prior knowledge. Thus, while a definition may be primary and immediate, it is not without an origin. This origin is sensory perception, from which the definition is derived via induction[5]. Induction—the form of reasoning Aristotle discusses in the Topics — consists in attributing a property to a genus by demonstrating that it belongs to the species contained within that genus. For instance, the “ancients” showed that the absence of a gallbladder in an animal is a sign of longevity by citing the examples of solipeds and deer—to which more recent observations might add the dolphin and the camel. Yet induction (which, it should be noted, concerns species rather than individuals)—even when complete—cannot reveal the necessity of the link between longevity and the absence of a gallbladder. This connection can only be grasped intellectually through physiological analysis, which demonstrates the liver’s role in sustaining life and identifies bile as a secretion—akin to an excrement—that affects the liver and, consequently, life itself. Thus, induction serves merely to prepare the way for an understanding of essences[6].
This conception of demonstrative science applies to instruction a method originally devised for dialectical discussion. Science, in this sense, is primarily the craft of the teacher—one who, by excluding any premises that lack certainty, can proceed dogmatically (like a geometer) rather than through the questioning method of the dialectician. However, the certainty of these foundational propositions cannot itself be an object or subject matter of science; for if it were, these propositions would have to be the conclusions of syllogisms—leading to an infinite regress that would render demonstration impossible. Therefore, for science to exist, there must be premises that are themselves indemonstrable and lie outside the scope of scientific inquiry. How, then, are these premises to be discovered? The dialectician or the rhetorician might seek them—depending on the context—in common or informed opinion; yet such an approach yields no true certainty. To whom, then, should the scientist turn? This question establishes the framework for the entirety of Aristotle’s philosophy, beginning with his metaphysics.
Notes
[1] Seconds Analytiques, l, 9 à IL
[2] Seconds Analytiques, II, 10.
[3] II, 3, 90 b 25.
[4] II, 7, 93 a 4.
[5] 24.1, 31, 88 a 4 ; II, 9, 100 b 3.
[6] Compare Premiers Analytiques, II, 25, and Des parties des animaux, IV, 3,
Source: Émile Bréhier (1951). Histoire de la philosophie, Presses Universitaires de France. Translation and adaptation by © 2026 Nicolae Sfetcu
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