Aristotle, Organon – Topics: on dialectic

Aristotle is the inventor of formal logic, that is to say of that part of logic which gives rules of reasoning independent of the content of the thoughts on which one reasons. But, despite appearances, the logical writings gathered under the name of Organon (instrument) do not give a systematic exposition of this logic. In appearance, in fact, they are arranged according to the chapter titles of the classical manuals of logic:

1° Categories, containing the theory of terms;
2° Of Interpretation, or theory of propositions;
3° First Analytics, or theory of syllogism in general;
4° Second Analytics, or theory of demonstration, that is to say of the syllogism whose premises are necessary;
5° Topics, or theory of dialectical and probable reasoning, whose premises are only generally accepted opinions;
6° Rhetoric, theory of oratorical reasoning or enthememe, whose premises are chosen in such a way as to persuade the audience.

The syllogism, whose elements have been shown in the first two treatises, is the common organ, studied by the third treatise, which is used equally by scholars, dialecticians and orators, each with different premises.

The reality is different. Aristotle wrote the Categories and the greater part of the Topics (books II to VII) before discovering the syllogism. He first meditated on the rules of reasoning only by thinking of the rules of a healthy discussion. Already, in Plato’s Sophist and Parmenides, we have seen how the idea of ​​logical frameworks (division and classification of terms, determination of primary genera, relations of the attribute to the subject) was born from the conditions of discussion; it was above all a question of overcoming the antilogical or eristic. It was in this milieu of ardent dialecticians that Aristotle’s logic was born. Now the dialectician has neither the procedures of the professor who expounds, nor even less those of the scholar who creates science; the dialectic is a dialogue where first an interlocutor submits a thesis to another who examines it; this examination is done by means of questions to each of which must be answered yes or no; the aim of the interrogation is generally to refute the respondent by leading him to contradict himself.

We have seen by what transposition Plato had made this dialectic the whole of philosophy. Aristotle had to abandon such hope early on; he lowers dialectics or the art of discussion to the rank of an exercise, which does not bring certainty, because it has regard not to the things themselves, but to the opinions of men on things. What defines dialectics as such is less in fact the logical structure of reasoning than the human relations that it implies; in a healthy discussion, one must be careful to take as starting points only propositions generally accepted, either by all men, or by competent men, if it is a question of a technical thesis: moreover, the questions posed must be neither too easy, since the answer is useless, nor too difficult, since one must answer them immediately. (2) Such procedures can only lead to analyzing and comparing judgments to show their agreement or disagreement.

But this exercise is indispensable, and it is in it that we will see the frameworks first of logic, then of the whole philosophy of Aristotle being born. His first concern concerns vocabulary: confusion in discussion comes from designating different things by the same name (homonyms) or the same thing by different names (synonyms); the indispensable preliminary is to enumerate the various meanings given to the words used in the discussion; almost all of his treatise on the Categories, and book A of the Metaphysics are devoted to these searches for vocabulary; it is less a question of distinguishing the things themselves than the various uses of the same word.

• (2) Topiques, I, 9 et 10.

Source: Émile Bréhier(1951). Histoire de la philosophie, Presses Universitaires de France. Translation and adaptation by © 2024 Nicolae Sfetcu