One of the most characteristic productions of the century is De jure belli et pacis (1625) by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the author of the doctrine of the law of nature, which claims to find universal rules and obligatory for all men, even in violent relationships between them; it is not in the name of individuals, it is in the name of impersonal reason that we decide whether a war is just or unjust, whether the prince has the right to impose a religion on his subjects or not, and what is the legitimate extent of its power. Wherever Machiavelli saw conflicts of individual forces, which could only be resolved by violence, Grotius sees relationships defined by law. Natural law is an order of reason which commands or defends an action, according to its agreement or disagreement with the nature of the reasonable being; it is a rule without any arbitrariness and that even God could not change. To this natural right is joined positive law, which is established either by God, when it concerns positive religion, or by the sovereign, when it concerns civil legislation: the great and only rule of positive law is not to contradict natural law. On the other hand, within these limits, it is natural law to respect positive law. From this, Grotius’ system concludes, to a very large extent, with the obligation to respect established powers. For example, he does not at all admit the right of resistance of the people against the sovereign; in fact the reason why the people came together in society and gave themselves a sovereign is that individuals are too weak to survive alone: however, nothing prevents them from giving to their sovereign the supreme power, that which a master has over his slaves. We see the meaning of this attempt: to justify, in the eyes of reason, certain positive rights, the right to war, the right to punish, the right to property, the right to sovereignty. The law is not made to make men independent of each other, but to bind them together. And if Grotius demands tolerance towards all positive religions, he no longer admits it when it comes to atheists and deniers of the immortality of the soul: there is a natural religion which obliges, as the natural law.
It is in the same spirit that the question of tolerance arises. In England, for example, pleas for tolerance are of two kinds: either they come from men who believe they can find reason through a natural religion comprehensive enough to unite all the Churches and put an end to dissensions; or they demand freedom of interpretation of the Bible, the Bible being “the only religion of Protestants”, proclaimed Chillingworth. To the first current belongs Herbert of Cherbury, who, in De Veritate (1628), proposes a means of putting an end to religious controversies and of overcoming “the obstinacy with which the miserable man embraces all doctor’s opinions or rejects them all, as not knowing how to make the choice” (1); this choice will be made by distinguishing common notions, which are primitive, independent, universal, necessary, certain, from all adventitious beliefs. These common notions form a true creed, affirming a sovereign power which must be the object of worship, teaching that this worship consists above all of a virtuous life, that vices must atone through repentance, and that they will be punished after death, as virtue will be rewarded: a natural religion which establishes universal peace, not without a severe criticism of the illusion of “particular revelations”, and above all of the supposed necessity of a particular divine grace to everyone, for their salvation. At the end of the century, Locke did not use any other language.
- (1) Edition of 1639, p. 52
Source: Émile Bréhier(1951). Histoire de la philosophie, Presses Universitaires de France. Translation and adaptation by © 2024 Nicolae Sfetcu
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