Sfetcu, Nicolae (2022), Principles of intelligence analysis for agencies, business and (geo)politics, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.13691.59688, in Telework: https://www.telework.ro/ro/principles-of-intelligence-analysis-for-agencies-business-and-geopolitics/

 

Abstract

Intelligence, in addition to scientific knowledge, involves the inclusion of human, socio-economic and political factors in the equation, and obtaining it through analysis, information and predictions by combining all the factors involved. Intelligence analysis consists of applying individual and collective cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses in a given socio-cultural context.

 

Keywords: intelligence analysis, intelligence, intelligence services

 

Principles of intelligence analysis for agencies, business and (geo)politics

Nicolae Sfetcu

It seems that Francis Bacon was the first to state that „scientia potentia est„, (Bacon 1597) a Latin expression that can be translated as „knowledge is power”, with its later derivative „information is power”. Knowledge, as the main subject of epistemology, is classically defined by three criteria: it must be believed, true and justified. Information, on the other hand, is processed, organized and structured data. Does knowledge or information really give us the power Francis Bacon claimed?

Intelligence, in addition to scientific knowledge, involves the inclusion of human, socio-economic and political factors in the equation, and obtaining, through analysis, information and predictions by combining all the involved factors.

Intelligence analysis consists of applying individual and collective cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses in a given socio-cultural context. Brei states about the intelligence that

“… is more than information. It is knowledge that has been specially prepared for a customer’s unique circumstances. … The word ‘knowledge’ highlights the need for human involvement. Intelligence collection systems produce…. data, not intelligence; only the human mind can provide that special touch that makes sense of data for different customers’ requirements. …. The special processing that partially defines intelligence is the continual collection, verification, and analysis of information that allows us to understand the problem or situation in actionable terms and then tailor a product in the context of the customer’s circumstances. …. If any of these essential attributes is missing, then the product remains information rather than intelligence.” (Brei 1996)

 

In this context, Dr. Robert Levine, former intelligence analyst at the CIA for 33 years and currently a lecturer at the Krieger School of Arts and Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, highlights the principles on which an intelligence analyst must be based, in the work „Principles of Intelligence Analysis” published by the CIA in Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 65, No. 4, December 2021. In his paper he discusses the principles for an intelligence activity carried out by intelligence services. But just as the intelligence services were inspired by the intelligence activity of corporations (business intelligence, competitive intelligence, analytics), in the same way his observations can be extended to corporate, political, and even geopolitical intelligence analysts. (Levine 2021)

According to Levine’s statements in the article above, an intelligence analyst must take into account two fundamental elements in his presentation: the intelligence analysis itself, and the specifics of each client that will ultimately use the elaborated analysis:

The intelligence analysis client

Customers have multiple sources of information, their own biases and preferences, and terrible time pressures. In seeking to gain appreciation for his work, the analyst must protect his intellectual integrity and analytical objectivity by avoiding internal or external attempts to alter his judgments to satisfy political or bureaucratic objectives. (Zulauf 2021)

Turn customer questions into viable topics and intelligence requirements

Analysts must use their expertise and understanding of the client’s interests to refine broad questions into intelligence questions that can be logically answered based on evidence and informed judgment. Analysts must then translate those intelligence questions into clear and actionable collection requirements to generate additional evidence. If, for example, a decision maker asks whether a foreign state is stable, analysts must reveal the real concern (coups, economic stability, or popular uprising?) and create intelligence aspects that relate to each dimension. These aspects must be refined in the context of the specific country: its history, ethnic composition, loyalty of the officer corps, monetary reserves and balance of payments, etc.

Understand the customer’s perspective

People’s judgments and willingness to accept analytical conclusions are shaped by many factors, including backgrounds, experiences, and beliefs. Every decision maker has cognitive biases, including guiding theories (e.g., the liberal international order), beliefs about how the world works (e.g., the arc of history bends in a certain direction), or sacred beliefs (e.g., all things it happens for a reason). Therefore, it is essential for the analyst to understand as much as possible about the decision makers and the environment in which they operate. Each analytical claim, and the evidence and logic used to support it, should be prepared with decision makers in mind.

Be aware of the interplay between cognitive biases and metaphorical reasoning

Beginning in the 1970s, cognitive psychologists such as Daniel Kahneman, Vernon Smith, Richard Thaler, and Amos Tversky revealed some of the secrets behind how human beings make decisions and evaluate risks and rewards, and their work would greatly influence the field of information analysis. (Kahneman 2013) is an accessible overview of his work on bias, risk, and decision making. See also (Lanir and Kahneman 2006). Today, through training and professional standards, analysts must guard against how mental shortcuts can lead them astray.

Analysts should also pay attention to unacknowledged metaphorical reasoning—their own and their client’s. People perceive, think, experience and act through metaphors. In the words of Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker, ” metaphor really is a key to explaining thought and language.” (Pinker 2007) Metaphors translate amorphous concepts into concrete analogies. They provide coherent structures that help make sense of new information or possibilities, highlighting some features of a problem while hiding others. If a dispute is a war, we aim to defeat the other side, not to persuade them to agree with us.

Terrorism analysts, for example, may not recognize the influence of studying recruitment as gang-like behavior or virus-like contamination. (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2011) For a comprehensive review, see (Lakoff and Johnson 2008). Similarly, intelligence clients may not recognize that how they perceive foreign executives as mobsters or corporate executives affects their judgments. Their metaphors, however, shape what information they seek and react to, and what kinds of actions and reactions they anticipate and think are likely. Consider the consequences of viewing a war on drugs rather than an effort to treat addiction.

Intelligence analysis preparation

Analysts must examine the strengths and weaknesses of each report, its provenance, and consistency and inconsistency among available reports. They must investigate the circumstances of collection, motivations, access and miscommunications, the possibility of unintentional information loss or distortion, denial and deception. Even an intercepted conversation involves interpretations of intonation, tempo, and translation, among other factors.

A characteristic closely related to perspective is multidisciplinary analysis. Multidisciplinary analysis should be made a reality, not just an aspiration.

Know and consider opposing points of view

Etched on the wall inside the CIA entrance is the quote from the Gospel of John: „You shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free.” In an intelligence context, it is misleading. Analysts do not have a key to the truth. (Marrin 2020) Discover facts, connect them to plausible explanations, and construct arguments to support their judgments. Generally, there are alternative viewpoints and supporters for them. Ignoring opposing viewpoints does a disservice to clients and can sink the analyst’s case. (A passage from John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty: ” He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.” (Mill 1859)

Understand the full picture

Intelligence integration has narrowed the gaps between the collector, analyst, and consumer of intelligence, but analysts must be attuned to the ongoing risk that intelligence operations and the actions of decision makers can obscure causes and effects. For example, if a foreign power acts in a way that appears to be irrational or paranoid, analysts might conclude that its leaders are ill-informed or misled by their intelligence services. But in many cases foreign actions were in fact motivated by covert actions of their rivals.

There is another dimension to this unknown catalyst problem. Non-intelligence activities, including diplomacy, military actions, and the involvement of the private and non-governmental sector can have profound influences on the perceptions and actions of foreign actors. Analysts need to understand what forces influence the actions of foreign actors. (Hathaway 2000)

Develop consistent and comprehensive models

Analysts must understand complex situations well enough to provide clients with coherent and persuasive theories that logically link the available evidence. A case without a general theory of argument is particularly vulnerable to rejection. (Heath and Heath 2007)

None of this suggests that analysts should bury inconvenient evidence (gaps, counter-evidence) or suggest that there is only one explanation. Nor does it mean that a theory should become an intellectual straitjacket. However, without clearly articulated explanations, clients are left with a mess of partially digested evidence that forces them to assume analyst functions.

Analysts also have the task of specifying key assumptions, explaining how widely accepted those assumptions are, providing major counter-hypotheses, and exploring what happens if the assumptions are wrong.

Support the judgments

Few mistakes stand out so badly and undermine an oral or written presentation more than unsupported judgments or unexplained evidence. If a judgment is unsupported or poorly supported, the entire presentation can suffer from a reverse halo effect, meaning that a poorly supported claim affects the credibility of other arguments.

Don’t over-promise

Analysts should be humble about their ability to see into the future. Many intelligence problems are very complex problems with multiple, independent actors; hidden features; and evidence manipulated by intentionally misleading opponents. Moreover, predictions are rarely just about facts (for example, what the value of the stock market index will be in six months), but rather about causal relationships. Like all humans, analysts by nature seek to find relationships and explanations even when the data supporting such claims is weak and inconsistent. (Sloman and Fernbach 2017)

Pay attention to sequencing and structure

There are alternative ways to present an analytic finding, and there is rarely, if ever, a single way. Early in the production process, authors should consider how best to convey analysis and the relative balance of text and visuals and, when relevant, in-person briefings.

One of the most glaring cases of insufficient attention to presentation comes in the use of bullet points in writing or slide presentations such as PowerPoint. It is common to see intelligence products written as a series of similarly structured paragraphs or slides, each as a long declarative sentence followed by a series of bullet points. Enumerations often lack an inherent logical role or order. (Shaw, Brown, and Bromiley 1998) There can be a list of examples, key evidence, steps in a sequence, events in a timeline, etc. Without explanatory linking language (e.g., „the following are the most important reports that support this claim”), there is no way to know what kind of logic is being applied. As commonly used, bullet points lead to an approach that can be described as anecdotal analysis.

Use language that is appropriate for the customer

A skilled analyst adapts the client’s language with clear and direct prose. This might mean avoiding jargon or unnecessarily long and complex words, replacing nominals (e.g., the noun „intervention”) with active verbs („intervene”) or, as George Orwell famously advised, replacing Latin words with words from shorter common language. („circa” rather than „approximately”). Vary the length of sentences and avoid long ones. Readers and listeners get lost in sentences longer than 50 words, especially with multiple clauses and parenthetical phrases.

Readers can follow the active voice more easily and may prefer it over the passive voice. (Trudeau 2012) Furthermore, as a topic becomes inherently more complex, the more important it is to present it clearly. Simplicity is not about mitigating the analysis, but about being able to present the basic conclusion and support it succinctly and precisely.

Use numbers correctly

Many intelligence analysts have a clear discomfort with numbers and statistics. This causes them to make mistakes that misinform customers and undermine their credibility.

Pay attention to the audience

Analysts must develop and practice their reporting skills and, as with written products, adapt them to their audience. Although the content of the processed information is essential, it must be provided effectively. Word choice, intonation, rhythm, pauses, volume, gestures, facial expressions, and any number of other non-substantive aspects can make or break success. That said, sometimes the most important skill in a briefing is listening. Analysts must balance their own presentation with a strong interest in audience reactions.

Analysts should know their material so well that they can deliver a planned 20-minute presentation in one minute (quick talk), or elaborate to fill an hour if the client so desires. Each of these, regardless of length, should cover the same general outlines.

Present your analysis like a pro

Analysts must write or speak directly to their audience, not from below or above. This requires a confident yet conversational tone. Some analysts display false modesty, condescension, or distrust. Others fail to make their points because they are intimidated. All can lead to problems.

Anticipate questions and objections

Intelligence clients often learn the most when they can ask questions that address their specific needs or fill specific gaps in their understanding. Some analysts even structure their presentations as a series of questions and answers; this encourages the audience to prioritize questions and add their own. This question-and-answer approach can also be used effectively in written products.

Analysts who think they are clear when they use terms as ”likely”, ”unlikely”, or ”remote”, have in their minds a sense of what they mean. But there is no reason to assume that the public assigns the same meaning to those terms, they have in their own minds their own understandings of what they mean. (A growing body of literature supports the use of numbers rather than imprecise terms in probabilistic judgments. See (Friedman 2019), (Tetlock 2017), and (Mauboussin and Mauboussin 2018).

Conclusion

Intelligence analysis must be objective, thorough, timely, relevant, accurate and rigorous. Analysts must be held to the highest possible standard, and intelligence agencies should strive to promote such standards through training, management, structure and operations. Continuous learning, not a one-time inoculation, is essential.

Matthew Herbert also provides a useful set of principles in discussing the guidance on intelligence analysis reported by Colin Powell to the US director of intelligence, Mike McConnell. Powell is said to have advised McConnell thus:

”As an intelligence officer, your responsibility is to tell me what you know. Tell me what you don’t know. Then you’re allowed to tell me what you think. But you always keep those three separated.” (Weiner 2007)

Bibliography

• Bacon, Francis. 1597. Meditationes sacrae. Excusum impensis Humfredi Hooper.
• Brei, William S. 1996. Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure. Joint Military Intelligence College.
• Friedman, Jeffrey A. 2019. War and Chance: Assessing Uncertainty in International Politics. Bridging the Gap. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190938024.001.0001.
• Hathaway, Robert M. 2000. “Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests – Key Legislation | Arms Control Association.” 2000. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-01/confrontation-retreat-us-congress-south-asian-nuclear-tests-key-legislation.
• Heath, Chip, and Dan Heath. 2007. “Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die.” Stanford Graduate School of Business. 2007. https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/books/made-stick-why-some-ideas-survive-others-die.
• Kahneman, Daniel. 2013. Thinking, Fast and Slow. 1st edition. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
• Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 2008. Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press.
• Lanir, Zvi, and Daniel Kahneman. 2006. “An Experiment in Decision Analysis in Israel in 1975 – Speaking to Policymakers.” Studies in Intelligence 50 (4). https://www.cia.gov/static/f78bc68f80b48fc27cade92e0fd67ce0/Experiment-Decision-Analysis-Israel.pdf.
• Levine, Robert. 2021. “Principles of Intelligence Analysis.” Studies in Intelligence 65 (4). https://www.cia.gov/static/7514ffff9baca6c514433ee0f55629db/Article-Principles-of-Intelligence-Analysis-Studies65-4-Dec2021.pdf.
• Marrin, Stephen. 2020. “Analytic Objectivity and Science: Evaluating the US Intelligence Community’s Approach to Applied Epistemology.” https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1710806.
• Mauboussin, Andrew, and Michael J. Mauboussin. 2018. “If You Say Something Is ‘Likely,’ How Likely Do People Think It Is?” Harvard Business Review, July 3, 2018. https://hbr.org/2018/07/if-you-say-something-is-likely-how-likely-do-people-think-it-is.
• Mill, John Stuart. 1859. On Liberty. J. W. Parker and Son.
• Pinker, Steven. 2007. The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window Into Human Nature. Viking.
• Shaw, Gordon, Robert Brown, and Philip Bromiley. 1998. “Strategic Stories: How 3M Is Rewriting Business Planning.” Harvard Business Review, May 1, 1998. https://hbr.org/1998/05/strategic-stories-how-3m-is-rewriting-business-planning.
• Sloman, Steven, and Philip Fernbach. 2017. The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think Alone. Penguin.
• Tetlock, Philip. 2017. Expert Political Judgment. https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691178288/expert-political-judgment.
• Thibodeau, Paul H., and Lera Boroditsky. 2011. “Metaphors We Think With: The Role of Metaphor in Reasoning.” PLOS ONE 6 (2): e16782. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0016782.
• Trudeau, Christopher R. 2012. “The Public Speaks: An Empirical Study of Legal Communication.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1843415.
• Weiner, Tim. 2007. “Pssst: Some Hope for Spycraft.” The New York Times, 2007, sec. Week in Review. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/weekinreview/09weiner.html.
• Zulauf, Barry. 2021. “Safeguarding Objectivity in Intelligence Analysis.” Studies in Intelligence 65 (3). https://rieas.gr/images/HomelandSecurity/barryz2.pdf.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License CC BY 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.